More than one year ago, I hypothesized that no matter his official title and agency (or outside organization) Karl Harr really spent his whole life working for the CIA.
Recently, I put that hypothesis to the test via the Operation of Strategic Services (OSS, America’s wartime pre-cursor to the CIA) records housed at the National Archives in College Park, MD.
First, I ran a search for “Karl Harr”, which turned up no responses. Then, I shortened the search to just his surname, “Harr”.
That got me one hit - “Harr, Moon Duck”.
I kid you not.
Inside the OSS files
The Moon Duck Harr OSS file is split between two folders, one labeled “Harr, Moon Duck” and the other labeled “Harr, Moon ?” Both folders share the same National Archives ID number.
The Harr, Moon Duck folder contains two, one-sided papers. One is a document transfer and cross reference form, and the other is a withdrawal notice.
The Duck, Moon ? folder has two, two-sided papers comprising a student evaluation from the West Coast Training Center Area “WA” and a subject report. The student’s name is listed in a type-written field as “Moon”. The name “Harr” is handwritten in ink in the top, right-hand corner of the first page of the document.
In order to fully understand the implications of these documents, and the information contained therein, it is important to review the CIA’s use of pseudonyms, 201 files, and open code.
Pseudonyms
The use of pseudonyms, or fake names, pre-dates the founding of the Agency. As this training video reveals, OSS recruits were instructed to address other students by their pseudonyms, not their real names (if known).
Most pseudonyms remain unmatched, but researchers have connected some to known agents or officers.
For example, John Hamilton was a pseudonym used by Hollywood actor Sterling Hayden during his time in the OSS. Hayden is most widely known for his role as General Jack D. Ripper in the Stanley Kubrick film Dr. Strangelove.
Mary Haverstick wrote in her seminal 2023 book, A Woman I Know: Female Spies, Double Identities, and a New Story of the Kennedy Assassination, that “CIA aliases are like mice: if you see one, you probably have a hundred.”1
A Woman I Know is one of the most important recent books on the topic of CIA aliases and layered operations. For now, the following summary provides useful context as we consider the case of Moon Duck Harr:
The CIA’s use of false identities is complicated and that is by design. Career agents - or officers, as they’re called today - will have one set of aliases for use out in the field and another set of code names and pen names for use within the files. The key tactic is compartmentalization. By fragmenting the narrative into many little pieces, the Agency ensures that if one compartment is compromised, it won’t ruin the agent’s career or other active operations. All CIA files use this tactic of compartmentalization, effectively splitting one person into what appears to be a crowd. This is especially important when you need to keep a record of everything that’s happened, but you also need to be able to obscure that record from all except those with the knowledge of how its pieces interconnect. If you know just one code or pen name, but not the others, you come away with a profoundly incomplete and misleading picture of a person’s overall activity.2
201 files
The 201 file is the official place of storage for all biographic reporting and references on a given individual. The following summation collates information from numerous CIA publications and declassified materials (emphasis added):
The opening of 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group (ISG). An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desk and the ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria...Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operation Directorate (DO), specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals were requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents, and most categories of contract employees…
A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name. Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files are no longer of active interest and should be incorporated in the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN.
Researchers have identified many instances of 201 files in which the information cuts off abruptly. In those cases, there is usually an operations file that contains the rest of the information. That is how the system was designed.
Open code
Mary Haverstick provides a very helpful example of how CIA agents and officers of this era used open code:
Open code is an age-old technique in which spies communicate using shared references in a hastily established code that requires no codebook. If two agents needed a code to speak about Woodward and Bernstein, the reporters who broke the Watergate story, all they’d need to do is substitute the names “Elmwood” and “Rubinstein” and they’d have established the code. For example, if one spy reported that “Elmwood” recently got information from his contact with the funny voice, you’d know that Woodward just got new information from his source Deep Throat. This method doesn’t even require a warning to expect the code, and once established, it can be used repeatedly.3
It gets even more complicated when the names layered in can be pseudonyms or cryptonyms, which are securely-held, CIA-issued code names.
With knowledge of these three concepts, the key questions to consider as we examine the contents of the file are:
Is it possible, or even likely, that Moon Duck Harr is a pseudonym for Karl Harr?
How would that connection change our understanding of the broader story previously laid out in this newsletter?
Folder 1 - Harr, Moon Duck
Document Transfer and Cross Reference
Although this is an OSS file, immediately we find a CIA, not an OSS, form. The document transfer and cross reference form was used by the Agency when files were moved within its records division.
Here, we see that the form was processed on May 29, 1958. That was roughly three months after Karl Harr ascended to the role of Special Assistant to the President for Operations Coordination, following the sudden death of Fred Dearborn.
The document being transferred was dated August 1, 1945, five days before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and less than two weeks before Jay Reid’s article about the Japanese surrender was the first to hit the wires.
The record index file number tells us that the document is, or is from, a personnel file in Washington. The source symbol, RI/AR, most likely stands for Records Integration/Archives or Administrative Records.
Two important fields are redacted. The first is the name of the analyst who transferred the file. The second is the file’s destination. These two pieces of hidden information would speak to the Agency’s motivation for moving the file.
On the bottom of the page, we learn the reasons for the redactions (national security and CIA organizational security) as well as the declassification sequence.
The file was declassified on March 4, 2008 by a unit within the National Archives. It was then screened by another unit on March 9, 2020.
Although we are missing a few key data points, we have enough context to hypothesize that the transfer form refers to a pseudonym file being consolidated into the main 201 file because Karl’s ascension to the White House team made this information much more sensitive than it had been previously.
Withdrawal Notice
The withdrawal notice was inserted by the National Archives and speaks to the questions around the publication of this folder.
From the withdrawal notice we learn that on the same day the folder containing the transfer file was declassified, it was immediately removed “because access to it is restricted”.
The notice does not tell us how many pages were removed, but a stamp dated March 9, 2020 (less than one week before states began implementing shutdown orders due to the Covid-19 pandemic) tells us that a sanitized copy - the transfer form - was reinserted into the National Archives file.
Most likely the declassification followed by immediate withdrawal was a coordinated two-step that resulted in the removal of an unknown number of pages that accompanied the transfer form.
Apparently, 66 years after the CIA transferred the file, which itself will turn 80 years-old next August, it remains, in large part, too hot to handle.
Folder 2 - Harr, Moon ?
Student Evaluation
This document is the original student evaluation (not a copy), and it reveals overall marks achieved during the three-week special course. It also contains the following narrative evaluation of the student:
An excellent student, intelligent, eager to learn and very cooperative. He is outstanding compared to other Oriental students we have had in the past in that he learns quickly and grasps new ideas with very little difficulty. This in spite of the fact that he has some trouble in speaking and understanding English. Physically he is a rugged little fellow in very good condition, and really took part in the physical aspects of the training program. A capable, resourceful chap having good common sense, and showed an ability to retain what he had learned. He paid great attention to detail and did not hesitate to ask question [sic] (and intelligent ones too) regarding any point that was not clear to him. Friendly, typically quiet and reserved, but very personable and got along well. He is somewhat confused because of the uncertainty of his future but seems capable of handling any problems he may have once he gets into the field. He showed great interest and aptitude in absorbing instruction on special communications equipment. On Morse Code he tried very hard and memorized all the characters outside class, but had difficulty when he tried to copy them by ear.
Moon seemed to shy away a bit from any desire to mix in close combat, but in field work he was eager to absorb all there was to be had. He needs more work with weapons to develop further skill.
All in all, he was a hard and willing worker and a very good student.
Although we can never be certain that a given narrative is written in open code, the likelihood seems strong in this case. We can translate key segments as follows:
“He is outstanding compared to other Oriental students we have had in the past…” refers to Harr being a much better student than the other Army intelligence officers from the Pacific theater who had come through that particular training school. The OSS did not conduct operations in the Pacific theater, as General Douglas MacArthur claimed it as his own fiefdom.
“Physically he is a rugged little fellow in very good condition, and really took part in the physical aspects of the training program…” matches, aside from the stereotypical height reference, our understanding of Karl’s physical fitness, based on his football career at Princeton.
“A capable, resourceful chap having good common sense, and showed an ability to retain what he had learned. he paid great attention to detail and did not hesitate to ask question [sic] (and intelligent ones too) regarding any point that was not clear to him…” fits with what we know about Karl’s scholastic achievements at Princeton.
“Friendly, typically quiet and reserved, but very personable and got along well…” is an apt description of Karl’s relatability, which is evident in multiple oral history interviews he gave.
“He is somewhat confused because of the uncertainty of his future but seems capable of handling any problems he may have once he gets into the field…” speaks to the war coming to a close, leaving Harr not entirely clear about what he signed up for.
“He showed great interest and aptitude in absorbing instruction on special communications equipment…” connects with Karl’s focus on psychological warfare, which is a euphemism for propaganda. A summary of Eisenhower administration officials tells us that “Karl Harr served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and from 1958-1961 as Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination. In this capacity he was vice chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board and was concerned with the psychological impact of various national security policy actions” (emphasis added).
“Moon seemed to shy away a bit from any desire to mix in close combat, but in field work he was eager to absorb all there was to be had. He needs more work with weapons to develop further skill…” could be read as Harr not being a fit for a career in the Army or a judgement that he lacked (political) knife fighting skills. Although I cannot speak to the former, the latter appears to fit neatly. Karl was a consensus builder, well organized and reasoned. He was best suited to operationalizing the decisions of others.
This document also contains some very important information at the top of the front page.
The class is listed as “Special”, and the date is July 24, 1945. Since the dates do not match, we can conclude that this is not the document that was transferred from one file to another on May 29, 1958 by the CIA.
In handwriting, in the top right corner, we see “HARR” followed by two sets of initials in different handwriting that were written with different pens. I have not yet been able to match the initials to any known CIA persons.
Most important is the handwritten notation above the name field that reads, “M 201: 240745”. This notation tells us the 201 file in which this document was to be placed.
Subject Report
Paperclipped to the student evaluation is the original subject report, which appears to have been part of the broader training program.
This document was dated July 22, which was two days before the full evaluation was completed (assuming the year was 1945).
The class was listed as “Special” and the subject was “Reporting”. I have not yet succeeded in matching the instructor, listed as Berney, to any known person.
This document also includes a narrative summary of the student, as well as grades and the full list of courses taken during the training program.
The narrative section on this document fills in a few more details:
The above ratings are on the same basis applied to all students at WA. Among the (word missing) he would be a superior student. His only difficulty is a lack of knowledge about common place military, economic, and political facts known to the average American. This may be the result of his language difficulties, for example, words like hangars, turbines, high tension lines, etc. were unknown to him. It is not entirely a matter of language because after explanation he still seems unfamiliar with such matters. He requires additional instruction in basic information concerning military and economic subjects which he may be required to deal with in his work.
This narrative is especially telling. Ask yourself, if this were a real person, a little man from Korea brought back to the U.S. for espionage and operations training, why would he need to know “military, economic, and political facts known to the average American”?
Only an agent whose “field work” would be conducted in the halls of American power would need such knowledge.
Note the mention of hangars and turbines, both of which are connected to the aircraft industry, which has dep historical connections to the CIA.
The document says it is not a language issue alone - remember, on the broader evaluation, we learn that Harr did not hesitate to ask questions. The proposed remedy is more school.
How does that compare with Karl Harr’s post-war life?
Nearly perfectly.
Karl was admitted to Yale Law School within six months of his discharge from the Army in February 1946. After graduation, in 1948, he moved on to Balliol College, Oxford University, where he earned a Ph.D. in Political Science in 1950 as a Rhodes Scholar. His dissertation was titled, Popular Front in France.
Implications
Moon Duck Harr’s small OSS file aligns very well with what we know about Karl Harr, and the documents in the National Archives are likely just the tip of the iceberg.
Julia Child, who would go on to become a famous chef, was a secretary in the OSS. Her entire personnel file has been declassified and made public. It is 129-pages long.
The Agency likely has withheld the vast majority of the Moon Duck Harr personnel file, not to mention the 201 file, or files - one or more for pseudonyms along with the main index file.
Although we cannot yet prove that the OSS agent known as Moon Duck Harr was in fact the Karl Harr who would go on to coordinate covert operations for President Eisenhower, proving that connection would be a political bombshell.
If the agent and the man are one in the same, it would mean that the OSS trained a person in the waning days of World War II, who was then groomed for nearly a decade under the auspices of its successor agency, the CIA, before bringing that agent to Washington, D.C. and inserting him into the highest reaches of the federal government.
And that deep cover agent would be Jay Reid’s cousin, the man he spoke so highly of in a letter to Princeton alum and former U.S. Senator and NBA great, Bill Bradley.
Haverstick, Mary. A Woman I Know: Female Spies, Double Identities, and a New Story of the Kennedy Assassination. Crown. New York, 2023. Pg. 72.
Ibid. Pg. 41-42.
Ibid. Pg. 204